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I. Introduction
1. This article assesses the efforts of cooperation undertaken by the five Central Asian countries, namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, in order to promote patterns of sustainable land management in the region, contributing in this way to implement the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (hereinafter, UNCCD). 1 As reflected in the introduction to the Subregional Action Programme for the Central Asian Countries on Combating Desertification with in the UNCCD Context adopted by all five countries in September 2003, their respective national territories cover an area that is 'a classical example of an arid and sub-arid region characterized by serious crossborder problems of desertification'. Moreover, the development of irrigation in the region has caused one of the most spectacular man-made environmental catastrophes, leading to the progressive dry-out of the Aral Sea. Accordingly, the sustainable management of water resources is a highly sensitive issue in the region in which the Central Asian countries have not quite managed to establish a common ground for effective cooperation and concertation, 2 hence giving rise to potential conflict in the region. 3 2. Less noticed in academic circles, but intrinsically connected to water management issues in Central Asia, is land management in areas exposed to aridification and/or desertification. However, joint efforts to address and cooperate in this field are still relatively recent. In the following, we will appraise the incipient framework of (sub)regional cooperation that has been established since the early 2000s with significant international support, in order to foster sustainable land management in the framework of the UNCCD. In so doing, we will reflect upon the potential of this particular cooperation process to contribute -either on its own, or in combination with other more consolidated regional processes-to foster capacities among local communities and national authorities and strengthen in this way the weak governance structures in the Central Asian States. In line with what Kushkumbayev and Kushkumbayeva have recently argued, 4 we start from the assumption that different parallel ongoing processes of cooperation need to be bundled and streamlined into meaningful multilateral processes, which include the Central Asian states, as well as international institutions, investors and donors. Arguably, China has a significant role to play in this context. 3. Accordingly, this article is structured as follows. After presenting in section II the challenges that the Central Asian countries are facing -both, individually, and as a region-, section III appraises the legal framework, institutional settings and the actors involved in the implementation of the UNCCD in Central Asia. On this basis, section IV reviews more specifically the Central Asian Countries' Initiative on Land Management (CACILM) as a bottom-up process of capacitybuilding for local communities and national authorities to foster sustainable rural development practices that are streamlined into larger national and regional development policies. This will lead us to establish some final remarks on the suitability of this process to be streamlined with other processes such as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) so as to contribute more efficiently to foster regional stability through environmental sustainability.
II. Central Asia in Context: Struggling between Regional Challenges and Internal Decay
4. With the collapse of the USSR in December 1991, five new states gained independence in an area that has since become a new geopolitical reality: the Central Asian region. Yet, more than two decades after their independence, despite the region's relatively clear geographical contours and a common historical and cultural heritage of centuries, Central Asian states, as well as the common cooperation and integration processes so far put in place, remain remarkably feeble.
II.A. Two decades after independence: the ongoing quest for national and regional identity in the international community, while coping with rapidly evolving geopolitical constellations. Whereas initially the world seemed to develop towards unipolarity under the global hegemony of the West, the new millennium brought an increased multi-polarity with a number of rising global powers -such as China, India and a recovered Russian Federation-with strong claims for influence over the Central Asian region. 6. As a matter of fact, after an initial phase of Western or Eurocentric euphoria in their respective approaches towards international law and international relations, by the early 2000s the Central Asian states joined other post-soviet countries in a general move away from Westernization, and towards Eurasianization.
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In view of the progressive dilution of economic ties within the Commonwealth of Independent States, by the mid-1990s, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan launched a process of regional economic integration, joined shortly thereafter by Kyrgyzstan. 7 Eventually, in 1998 Tajikistan also acceded to participate in the process, which was renamed as Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). However, as Kembayev highlights, despite its formal enactment, 'trade within the CAEC declined steadily over the 1990s, and in most areas the members pursued independent policies without regard to intra-CAEC cooperation and at times in contradiction to stated CAEC policies and goals.' 8 Amidst the unrest caused by the United States' intervention in Afghanistan, the rise of Islamic extremism, and the wave of coloured revolutions in a series of post-soviet states, the Central Asian states shifted towards Eurasianism, thus engaging in a deep restructuration of ongoing cooperation and integration processes. Happold ed., 2012), at 248. As highlighted by this author in an earlier publication, as an ideology that has is influential among internationalists in the region, Eurasianism vindicates 'the uniqueness of the Eurasian civilization being neither of the West nor the East, but between the two, i.e. between Occidentalism as a form of progress, freedom, personality, and rational organization of life and Orientalism as a symbol of order and stability, high spirituality and mystical illuminations… Eurasianism includes the idea of a third economic and social way: neither East nor West, neither capitalism nor communism and neither democracy nor totalitarianism.' See R. Tkatova, Central Asian States and International Law: Between Post-Soviet Culture and Eurasian Civilization, 9 Chinese JIL 205 (2010), at 217.
6
Treaty for the establishment of an Integrated Economic Zone (10 Jan. 1994).
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Treaty for the establishment of a Single Economic Space (30 April 1994). Tkatova at n 5.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 10 Only three years later, after the accession of Russia in 2004, the CACO was merged with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). So far, the latest development in this evolution is the Russian initiative to establish an Eurasian Union. Nevertheless, this gradual shift did not lead to convergent foreign policies either: whereas Kazakhstan has sought (and arguably achieved) multi-vectoral leadership in the region, 11 Kyrgystan and Tajikistan have followed a neutral cooperation approach. For their part, Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan have taken an isolationist approach, albeit with different intensities.
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7. The main factors that underlie to the weak degree of regional integration and convergence have been found in the 'similarity of the members' economic specialization in a fairly limited range of resources' (cotton, oil, gas and minerals), as well as in political rivalries for regional leadership, ethnic tensions, and security concerns related to Islamism.
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At the same time, a range of foreign powers have been pursuing their own agendas with respect to the Central Asian countries, seeking to increase their influence over this strategic region, arguably with a hampering effect for integration. With the decline of Russian influence in the 1990s, the United States and the European Union were among the strongest players on the ground. However, once the Western euphoria declined and the Russian Federation re-emerged, the aforementioned tilt towards Eurasianization led to a relative decrease of their influence, especially that of the EU. 14 But also China has sought to contribute to the establishment of sound economic and security ties with the Central Asian countries, so as to gain access to their natural resources and ensure the development of its western provinces. As a matter of fact, China is presently about to surpass the United States as the biggest international investor in the region.
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The increasing competition between China and Russia to preserve or expand their influence in the region has seemingly reached its climax with the Russian bid for an Eurasian Union. Yet, this situation puts the Central Asian states before the fatal choice between Russia or China, a
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Treaty on the establishment of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (28 February 2002).
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The proposal forwarded in 2007 by the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev to establish a Central Asian Union may be seen in this context.
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Tkatova at n 5, at 213-6. Equally, see Kembayev at n 8, at 976.
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Kembayev at n 8, at 976. dilemma with significant implications for their respective development options.
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8. Last but not least, shifting geopolitical constellations, foreign powers competing for influence and enduring rivalries between Central Asian states are not the sole reasons for the weak degree of regional integration attained so far. Due to their relatively recent independence, the Central Asian countries remain involved in a still unsettled process of national self-identification. As a matter of fact, one needs to remind that these peoples 'had previously existed as tribal entities or as part of an empire,' 17 but had never reached statehood before. Yet, while these processes may have led to attitudes or policies of national reaffirmation and inwardness in the Central Asian elites, they have certainly not contributed to strengthen these countries' actual statehood. Quite to the contrary, the state infrastructure itself remains dramatically weak at present, as all five states -including Kazakhstan, as the most developed among them-have significant structural deficiencies that may lead to internal decay in a near future. The situation is particularly severe in the two poorest countries -Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan-who are actually looking into the abyss of state failure. 18 As it seems, however, this decline has not so much to do with the aforementioned challenges arising from the Soviet legacy that all Central Asian countries share. Rather, corruption and bad governance by the ruling elites are to blame, as they have dramatically failed to maintain and replace over the years the once existing human capital and physical infrastructure inherited from the USSR. Also here, supported by donor countries, Central Asian states have made significant efforts to implement these treaties at regional or subregional level, as we shall see in the following with respect to the UNCCD. 14. In a way, then, the differential treatment enshrined in the Rio Conventions to the benefit of less developed countries has offered the Central Asian states promising tools for attracting foreign investments in order to finance their national development, while enhancing social and environmental sustainability.
In what follows, we shall appraise whether this strategy has been successful in the specific context of the implementation of the UNCCD in Central Asia, given the particular mix of security and sustainability challenges that this region is presently facing. ecosystem the soil which is a natural resource under the jurisdiction of states. From a legal perspective, the UNCCD builds upon obligations stemming from general international law, such as the obligation to prevent activities conducted in its territory from causing damage to the territory of another country. 34 To this end it sets up a global framework of inter-state and transnational cooperation to address the causes leading to aridification and desertification, by promoting the sustainable use of land, 35 in what has been qualified as an example of postmodern global governance. 36 It starts from the assumption that economic and social factors cause desertification just as much as physical factors do and that desertification is thus to be regarded both as cause, as well as result, of socioeconomic disorder. For this reason, the UNCCD focuses not only on the environmental dimension of the issue, but inspires from a bottom-up approach that addresses the socio-economic conditions of rural developing country people as an integral part of the strategy to tackle desertification.
III. The implementation of the UNCCD in
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This specific feature of the UNCCD has led authors like Bo Kjellén to brand it as an instrument which is half way between an environmental and a developmental treaty. 38 Accordingly, the UNCCD relies significantly on differential treatment between developed and developing states,
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given also the fact that there is a 'high concentration of developing countries, notably the least developed countries, among those experiencing serious drought and/or desertification'. 40 In so doing, countries affected by drought or desertification, on the one hand, and developed countries, on the other hand, undertake each different sets of obligations: whereas the former undertake to give due priority to the issue and to adopt measures to prevent and mitigate desertification to the extent of their available resources, 41 developed states either individually or jointly undertake for their part to support those efforts by providing financial and technological means. Art. 6. The intertwined nature of these commitments is made particularly evident in art. 20 (7), one of the UNCCD's central provisions concerning financial resources, according to which '[t]he full implementation by affected developing 16. Furthermore, despite its global scope, the UNCCD was designed in order to rely on regional, and even subregional, institutions for its implementation. 43 The Convention is actually complemented with five additional regional implementation annexes for Africa (Annex I), Asia (Annex II), Latin America and the Caribbean (Annex III), the Northern Mediterranean (Annex IV), and for Central and Eastern Europe (Annex V), all of which form an integral part of the Convention. 44 As pointed out in the literature on the negotiation of the Convention's text, initially only a specific regional implementation annex was foreseen for Africa, in order to cope with the UN General Assembly's mandate, in which it was implicit to put particular emphasis on the situation in the African continent. 45 However, fearing a disproportionate allocation of financial and technological resources to African states, to the detriment of other developing countries, Asian and Latin American states also requested their own, specific regional implementation annexes.
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However, the various regional annexes are quite divergent from each other. As Burns points out, in contrast to other regional annexes, the Asian annex is fairly brief and its provisions strikingly general in content, thereby 'reflecting the belief of Asian nations that detailed provisions were not appropriate on a continent marked by great geographical diversity'. 47 17. The aforementioned features of the UNCCD's regional implementation annex for Asia (RIAA) may be regarded as symptomatic not only for geographical, but even more so, for remarkable political heterogeneity and the country Parties (...) of their obligations under the Convention will be greatly assisted by the fulfilment by developed country Parties of their obligations under the Convention, including in particular those regarding financial resources and transfer of technology. In fulfilling their obligations, developed country Parties should take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first priorities of affected developing country Parties, (...).'
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In pursuing the UNCCD's objective, states shall inter alia '... (d) promote cooperation among affected country Parties in the fields of environmental protection and the conservation of land and water resources, as they relate to desertification and drought; (e) strengthen subregional, regional and international cooperation; (f) cooperate within relevant intergovernmental organizations; (g) determine institutional mechanisms, if appropriate, keeping in mind the need to avoid duplication; and (h) promote the use of existing bilateral and multilateral financial mechanisms and arrangements that mobilize and channel substantial financial resources to affected developing country Parties in combating desertification and mitigating the effects of drought.' See art. 4 (2). Ibid., at 862. absence of a strong and homogeneous regional identity in the continent, as the only obvious motivation for the request for such an annex was not to lag behind Africa in financial and technological transfers from developed countries. In this particular context, moreover, Central Asian countries did not appear as a (sub)regional actor. It may be assumed that the five Central Asian Republics did not yet adopt an own subregional profile in this specific setting, due to their still very recent independence and their initial priority to underscore national sovereignty over regional alliances and integrative efforts. 18. Be that as it may, article 11 of the Convention allows countries affected by serious drought and/or desertification 'to prepare, as appropriate, in accordance with relevant regional implementation annexes, subregional and/or regional action programs to harmonize, complement and increase the efficiency of national programs', further stating that '[s]uch cooperation may include agreed joint programs for the sustainable management of transboundary natural resources, scientific and technical cooperation, and strengthening of relevant institutions'. Moreover, article 5 RIAA allows relevant countries 'to entrust subregional, including bilateral or national organizations, or specialized institutions, with responsibilities relating to the preparation, coordination and implementation of programs. Such organizations or institutions may also act as focal points for the promotion and coordination of [implementing] actions'. 48 Therefore, building upon national action plans (NAP) as the ultimate instrument of the UNCCD's implementation, these may be streamlined and complemented through subregional, and even regional, action plans (SRAP, and RAP, respectively) in view of an enhanced effectiveness of the implementation measures. 49 After several preparatory meetings held in the middle 90s, Asian countries established a RAP based on six Thematic Program Networks (TPN). 50 48 RIAA, Art. 5 (1).
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Pérez-Salom, at n 39, at 98. 19. In addition to the RAP and its TPN, SRAP have also been adopted for South Asia, South-East Asia, North-East Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, and South Pacific. However, these mechanisms of regional and subregional cooperation do not seem to have been functioning properly. As highlighted in a workshop held by representatives of the UNCCD national focal points of Asian countries participating in the aforementioned SRAP, despite the initial momentum that led to their constitution, the activity of the TPN under the RAP rapidly decreased to a point of stagnation, mainly due to the lack of financial resources. And even though the different SRAP seem to have been more effective than TPN in fostering (sub)regional cooperation, affected countries are complaining also here about a structural lack of financial resources to enhance the operation of these mechanisms. 21. The SRAP's objectives are focused on the coordination of national implementation efforts, the enhancement of information and experience exchanges, the development and implementation of joint programs, and the mobilization of bilateral and multilateral donors to support their coordinated action. Further, it identifies a series of thematic areas such as monitoring and evaluation of desertification processes, the management of water resources in agriculture, the management of pastures and forest resources, the conservation of biological diversity, or economic capacity building of local communities in which common endeavors under the SRAP enjoy priority. The main instruments for such cooperation comprise the implementation of national and subregional pilot projects, the furtherance of scientific cooperation, and the establishment of an information sharing system on desertification and land degradation in Central Asia. 22. The implementation of the SRAP ought to be coordinated and monitored at the national level through a national coordinating body (NCB), generally the competent Ministry or Agency. At the international level, monitoring and coordination takes place ordinarily through the meetings of national focal points for the UNCCD convening at least once a year , and through the Conference of Ministers responsible for their countries' participation in the UNCCD. This latter meeting is defined as 'the highest governing body for the monitoring and coordination of the SRAP/CD implementation', and should meet at least once every three years. 57 Moreover, the different donors participating in the Strategic Partnership Agreement are to be involved in the consultative process, particularly with the government officials responsible for the implementation of the SRAP. Finally, the important role of NGOs, public organizations, and local authorities in the implementation process is also acknowledged. However, as it will be seen in the following sections, the subregional institutional arrangements set up to channel inter-state and transnational cooperation for the implementation of the UNCCD have grown and become more complex. (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) . 58 However, the withdrawal in 2010 of the ADB the executing agency that had so far supported CACILM's multicountry framework project (CMFP) and its institutional arrangements opens up a third, less promising phase. This setback obliged to restructure the process under the aegis of the UNDP, and, more generally, casts shadow over the initiative's future. 
IV. Getting the Subregional Action
IV.A. The Tashkent
60
Its most significant result was the adoption of the so-called 'Tashkent Joint Platform of Action for UNCCD Implementation', in which all participants reaffirmed their shared commitment i.a. to initiate a high level policy dialogue on issues related to desertification and land degradation, to enhance sub-regional cooperation in the field of sustainable natural resource management, and to integrate the UNCCD's objectives into ongoing subregional initiatives on sustainable development in Central Asia. 61 According to the Forum's final report, the underlying rationale to the Joint Platform was the evidence that 'resource mobilization for the UNCCD can neither be a one time nor a stand-alone activity but needs to be anchored in processes that seek to fulfill long term objectives', and that therefore, there was a need to establish a participatory and effective institutional setting 'in order to ensure ownership and commitment to seeing identified priorities translated into concrete activities'.
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To that end, it was agreed to establish a Working Group on Partnership Development for UNCCD Implementation in each one of the five Central Asian countries, which ought be composed not only of high level governmental representatives, but should also integrate more broadly national 63 and Ibid, at 5-6.
Ibid, at 7.
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In particular, national partners of each country's Working Group should include '[r]epresentatives of Parliament, and Ministries and agencies dealing with Environment, Finance, Economy, Agriculture, Hydrometeorology, Water, Forests and Land Resource Management, Planning, Foreign Affairs, Education and Science and other relevant governmental agencies, the National Focal Point for the UNCCD, as well as, representatives from local governance bodies, civil society and the private sector. The Focal Point Institution for the UNCCD and a relevant Ministry will function as coordinators to facilitate the functioning of the Working Group and for information sharing. Attempts should be made to international partners. 64 The Working Groups' main functions were to provide a standing platform for dialogue, thereby promoting coordination between national actors and international development partners. In this way partnerships were to be fostered between the Central Asian countries and the donors, leading eventually to the implementation of pilot projects.
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25. After the GEF had been appointed to perform the functions of the UNCCD's financial mechanism, 66 its Governing Council instructed the implementing and executing agencies to increase their efforts to establish projects under the operational program on sustainable land management. 
These should aim particularly at the development of technical packages to combat desertification/land degradation using a participatory and integrated approach for promoting sustainable natural resource management; designing models of broad participation in planning and implementation; establishing institutional linkages for policy harmonization; exploring innovative funding sources; providing services at the community level through private sector and other structures geared for improving the living conditions of local communities; the improvement of desertification monitoring and assessment systems; and/or the collection and sharing of information on desertification/land degradation related issues. See ibid, at 8-9. 
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The Steering Committee, for its part, is composed of governmental representatives of the five Central Asian countries, the various GEF implementing and executing agencies (World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, ADB, FAO, and IFAD), the GM, as well as bilateral agencies (GTZ, CIDA and SADC), and other international organizations participating in CACILM projects. Within this context, initially, the ADB took over the Steering Committee's chair and provided the CACLIM Secretariat. 78 The Steering Committee is responsible for the overall direction of CACILM. Further, it monitors the performance of the multicountry projects implemented within the CACILM and reports to the GEF.
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Finally, a Public Participation Plan devises current and potential roles for stakeholders in the different program areas, according to their respective interests and capabilities (see table 3 ). 80 28. Still, despite the promising outline of the CACILM and its institutional and financial arrangements, its early operation demonstrated the sheer difficulty to implement its quite ambitious objectives. 81 Several factors may explain it. However, the most important one seemingly lies in a somewhat unequal commitment by the different Central Asian countries to uphold the process' momentum. Admittedly, the Multicountry Secretariat's first performance report for the year 2007 did sound quite optimistic. Even though few specific results could be shown at that moment, the Multicountry Secretariat considered that 29. However, in its following performance report for 2008, the tone already became a little more skeptical. With respect to national implementation projects for sustainable land management, Kazakhstan was reported to be lagging behind, as none of the projects that had qualified for UNDP/GEF funding had been started. Also ADB/GEF investment projects were found to have a slow start in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In contrast thereto, multicountry projects scored 'good progress', and 'certain progress' was considered to have been achieved towards the realization of the CACILM's general outcomes. Nevertheless, in its recommendations for future action, the assessment report also highlights a general situation of lacking coordination and cooperation, and stresses the urgent need for some sort of platform for the Multicountry Secretariat to meet regularly with the various National Secretariats to discuss technical matters, share experience, and coordinate their actions, particularly in large investment projects destined to capacity building. Uncoordinated reporting was also thought to hamper effective monitoring of the ongoing projects. 83 30. Even though an initial joint workshop between the Multicountry Secretariat and its national counterparts was held in Byshkek in February 2009 in response to the aforementioned situation, the ADB decided to end its participation in CACILM after phase I during that year. Its participation was definitively completed by 30 June 2010. In its technical assistance completion report, the responsible ADB officer made an overall positive assessment of the CACILM project, but highlighted some crucial shortcomings and difficulties. 31. CACILM's institutional arrangements were reported to have worked efficiently throughout phase I, even though the National Secretariat of Tajikistan was found to have performed poorly, due to under qualified leading staff. This notwithstanding, it was said that a favorable environment for effective coordination and implementation of the NPFs, and for the attraction of land management investment had been created in the Central Asian countries. Further, the information system set up was assessed as one of the projects most successful components, as hitherto inaccessible key data had been collected and made available to the National Secretariats through the Multicountry Secretariat. ICARDA had also initiated research activities on sustainable land management in all five countries, the results of which could only be properly appraised in the longer run. 32. Despite this overall positive assessment, the completion report also highlights remarkable deficits. Whereas CACILM's phase I had been successful in creating and gathering knowledge about sustainable land management in Central Asia, the report complains about a lacking culture of knowledge-sharing between and within the countries in the region. In this context, it implies resistance to make the gathered knowledge easily available to the general public and regrets that no mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge and research results to farmers in the rural areas were put in place. And last, but not least, the completion report also highlights an unsatisfactory cooperation with bilateral and multilateral donors, 'as the co-funding agencies (GTZ and UNDP) were not performing as well as would have been expected as a result of a lack of an accountability mechanism'. 85 IV.C. The remains of CACILM under the aegis of UNDP 33. As an immediate consequence, the withdrawal of the ADB meant the end of the CACILM Multicountry Framework Project and the logistical and financial support to the institutional arrangements that had been set up for subregional cooperation to implement the UNCCD. Nevertheless, even if seriously hit in the very center of its operational structure, the cancellation of the ADB's involvement does not mean the end of CACILM, which has entered in the meantime into its implementation phase (phase II). Despite their slow start and notorious delay, several national and multicountry sustainable land management projects funded by bilateral and multilateral donors particularly the UNDP were on their way (see table 3 ). One of the most significant ones, due to its strategic importance to the CACILM, was the Multicountry Capacity Building 2011).
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Ibid, at 2. See also Simonett and Novikov at n 81 above, at 11.
Project, led by the UNDP, which underwent its mid-term evaluation in 2011. 34. As highlighted in the conclusions of the aforementioned Mid Term Report, the ADB's withdrawal meant almost immediately the collapse of the National Coordination Councils and the National Secretariats in all Central Asian republics, except for Uzbekistan, due to the lack of budgetary resources to sustain their operation. National Secretariats and consultative structures similar to the NCCs were reestablished in the second half of 2010 with the support from the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, formerly GTZ). In this sense, the report signals that the CACILM structure through which the Project was to act and was to strengthen has been weakened by the withdrawal of ADB but not fatally. The CACILM Framework is still highly valued in each country and the [Multicountry Capacity Building Project] MCB needs to better focus its efforts to strengthening this in a few directions so it can play its intended role in building a sustainable SLM structure. 86
35. However, UNDP's present management arrangements for the Multicountry Capacity Building Project are called into question and correcting actions are recommended in this regard. 87 Moreover, it suggests initiating a process to review and enhance CACILM's institutional arrangements, in order to make them more stable and ensure their long-term survival. In particular, the reviewers consider it necessary to enhance and stabilize the National Coordination Centers and Secretariats (or equivalent structures) in each country. At the same time, they propose to investigate more durable forms of institutionalization for multicountry regional cooperation within CACILM, which are acceptable to the UNCCD Focal Points, the relevant high level authorities in the Central Asian countries, as well as to likely donors. More specifically, the reviewers clearly suggest embedding or associating the CACILM framework to the IFAS, an idea that would have at least in principle the official support of all five Central Asian countries. In this way, regional cooperation in the field of sustainable land management would be upgraded and integrated into policy structures and international institutions, which are dealt with at presidential level within each country. At the same time, such an association is thought contributing to coordinate and streamline two intimately related policy areas such as the sustainable management of land and water resources, as IFAS is 'an institution that has water policy and sustainable development objectives, both highly 
V. Concluding remarks
36. It may be concluded that the CACILM process neither is a success, nor a complete failure. The present case-study shows that the five Central Asian countries have identified shared problems and common interests in the field of sustainable land management and the prevention of land degradation and/or desertification for technical cooperation in the region, probably due to its technical and relatively de-politicized nature. Hence, all five Central Asian countries have established structures for cooperation in the process of implementation of their respective international obligations undertaken in the UNCCD. However, the analysis of the preparations for the adoption of the SRAP-CA and the CACILM, as well as the latter's implementation process clearly demonstrate that the Central Asian countries commitment and capacity to sustain a subregional framework of cooperation for sustainable land management is dependent on international technical and financial support. Yet, the low political profile of the CACILM process, and the lacking will or capacity of the relevant national administrative bodies to engage in a meaningful exchange of information and knowledge also hampers the effectiveness of the initiative and does not contribute to create an attractive environment for foreign investors and international donors. 37. Equally, national and regional efforts to combat soil degradation and desertification have not yet been properly mainstreamed with other more consolidated processes of regional cooperation for the sustainable management of natural resources, such as those concerning the transboundary river basins. At present, the idea of embedding or, at least, associating the CACILM process to the IFAS seems to be on the political agenda. If such an initiative were to be successful, a huge step forward would be made towards the integration and more rational management of two deeply related policy areas relevant for the sustainable use of natural resources. Moreover, it would contribute to politically upgrade the CACILM process and stabilize its institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, whether the CACILM will effectively be linked to IFAS, and if so, under what conditions, still remains to be seen. 38. At the same time, despite well-intentioned public participation plans, in practice, the CACILM process has not been congruent with the original bottomup approach of postnational governance that allegedly underlies to the UNCCD and Agenda 21. Indeed, conditions for the effective participation and influence
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Ibid, at 47.
of communities need to be created also in the field of land management, beyond externally imposed organizational formulas. 89 The use of the term 'local communities' is deliberate, since those of 'civil society' or 'NGO' seem inappropriate in the present political context of the Central Asian regimes. 90 In order to be effective, consultation and participation patterns need to emerge from the idiosyncrasy and cultural tradition of Eurasianism. The previous assessment of the CACILM process reveals an almost complete absence of meaningful interaction between international and domestic authorities with the local communities, despite the formally impeccable provisions of its Public Participation Plan. Yet, as Asel and Spoor have so accurately written with respect to the water management policies in the region, [w] hat the logic of development obscures by equating poverty with helplessness is that communities are often quite resilient and that social bonds they have developed over long periods are adaptable to both changing environmental and political economic conditions. It is this resilience that ensures the sustainability of traditional approaches to water use, distribution and management which in turn are cognizant of the dynamic nature of ecosystems. When outside interventions upset the resilience of ecosystems and adaptability of communities, however, unsustainability becomes inevitable.
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39. If it were successful in fostering synergies between national authorities and local rural communities (either by its own or in coordination with other processes), the CACILM could make a contribution, albeit a modest one, to strengthen social cohesion, economic development and political stability in the Central Asian states. In this way, this process of subregional cooperation against desertification, even if in a very narrow and specific field, might signal new ways towards regional stability in Central Asia by enhancing social and environmental sustainability. 
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See Buxton, at n 76.
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Arsel & Spoor, at n 89, at 274. Available at <http://www.global-mechanism.org/en/gm-publications/gmpublications/the-central-asian-experience-a-partnership-approach-forfinancing-unccd-implementation/download> (last access: July 25, 2013). 
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